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Maritime power has traditionally been a central part of the UK’s defence planning and is well 
suited to supporting a wide range of military operations. The littoral area has always created 
problems for naval planners as most landings historically have had to endure a tactical 
separation of the naval and land components, and hence an artificial seam between the Navy 
and the Marines. With the end of the Cold War, amphibious operations are going to be more 
difficult to conduct than in the past, and amphibious forces are going to have to adopt 
manoeuvre warfare capabilities in order to successfully complete their missions. It is very 
likely that amphibious forces will have to conduct operations against a numerically superior 
enemy, who is on his own terrain, and be surrounded by a neutral, if not hostile populace. As 
such, the concept of Operational Manoeuvre From The Sea (OMFTS) whereby the sea is used 
as a manoeuvre space, and command and control is fast enough to cope with large amounts of 
information, but at the same time allow subordinates maximum flexibility to use their 
initiative, is increasingly attractive. It will be important not only for the combat elements to be 
able to use this new concept, but the Combat Service Support (CSS) elements as well. 
 
The Amphibious Environment 
 
An organization's strategies must be matched to the environment within which it operates.  It 
is therefore important to asses the impact of the changing political and defence environments 
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on the UK amphibious landing force and how it operates. Environmental factors that are likely 
to influence present and future operations include the lack of a deep water global naval threat; 
a multi-polar world; the increase in ethnic, religious and tribal conflict; the rise of non-state 
actors; the increase in media attention given to foreign military operations; the growing 
importance of military casualties as regards media coverage; the increase in high technology 
weapon sales, especially by China, North Korea and Russia; the continued decline in defence 
spending but growing interest in intervention and expeditionary capabilities and the increase 
in the accuracy and lethality of commercially available weapon systems. 
 
The scenario that can be constructed from this confirms that amphibious operations need to 
move out of the inshore area to deeper water, thus escaping the increased threats around the 
beach.  The structural attractiveness of this scenario is self evident: the sea provides a barrier 
from the enemy, or potential enemy, whilst allowing for manoeuvre space and this view is 
consistent with the OMFTS doctrine. 
 
The identified sources of competitive advantage all point towards logistics.  They demonstrate 
that the logistics must be sea-based if the competitive advantages of OMFTS are to be 
realised, however, this goes against the current military logistics paradigm, which emphasises 
the considerable friction present in military operations.  Ignoring it could lead to the adoption 
of a strategy that is not robust enough to cope with the demands of combat. 
 
The Amphibious Logistics Supply Chain 
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Despite the occasional sharp reminder of its importance, the understanding of logistics in the 
Armed Forces is not widespread.  In practice, there is scant evidence that proper preparation 
for war has been attempted by the majority of twentieth-century operational planners and little 
thought has been given to the ideal combination of assets which, in theory would enhanced 
their logistic support capability. 
 
Yet much has been written to suggest that logistics can provide a source of competitive 
advantage and value, reduce costs and offer improved service levels. The current system is as 
follows. When an order to undertake an amphibious operation has been given, the MOD will 
outload the relevant War Reserve Schedules (WRS) needed to conduct the operation (fuel, 
ammunition, vehicles etc.). These items (that are stored around the country in various depots) 
are taken to the port of embarkation and loaded onto specialist military shipping, or a civilian 
ship requisitioned for the task (known as a Ship Taken Up From the Trade - STUFT). When 
the area of the operation is reached, the ships will be positioned as close to the beach as 
possible (allowing for factors such as weather, tidal conditions, enemy presence etc.) and the 
combat elements off-load first. The logistic support elements will then be off-loaded 
(Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines) into a Beach Support Area (BSA), as will 
whatever parts of the WRS are needed to support the operational plan. The ships will then 
withdraw, and the operation will become land based. The command and control arrangements 
are suitably complex. The Landing Force Support Party (LFSP) is at the hub, and facilitates 
the movement of troops, equipment and supplies through the landing zones, and assists in 
evacuating casualties, refugees and POWs. The landing force will also need to communicate 
with the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and the Assault Supply Party 
(ASP) on each ship (which keeps track of the inventory and stowage position for their vessel).  
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The requirements of sea based logistics are founded on the premise that demands for CSS will 
greatly increase and the CSS must be structured to operate in a shipboard environment with 
little or no footprint ashore.  CSS must be provided to the consumer on-site, as must the 
replacement of unserviceable equipment, with repair carried out onboard ship, if necessary.  
Large inventories of stock will no longer be possible in limited cargo ship space.  The sea-
based logistics system must overcome the time, distance and volume factors and provide 
responsive CSS in a seamless manner.  It must have the capability to support forces almost 
entirely from a sea base.  Moreover it must be flexible to the extent that the sea base can 
operate from near shore or at distances well over the horizon, whilst still delivering timely and 
reliable CSS.  The system must be designed to optimise the capabilities of the operational 
assets as well as provide the support and sustainment that is necessary. 
 
Sea Base 
 
A functional sea base with embarked logistic personnel, material and equipment is a critical 
element in supporting and sustaining the manoeuvre force during OMFTS.  The capabilities 
that such a base would require are: 
 
• The capability to access and offload any embarked item without delay. 
• Perform the standard CSS functions from afloat or move them ashore. 
• Rapidly discharge or embark all supplies, equipment, personnel and facilities. 
• Store all classes of supply to support an assault and the follow on force. 
• Operate with all ship-to-shore transfer systems. 
 
Total Asset Visibility (TAV) 
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To have a true selective offloading capability and a responsive supply system, total visibility 
of all assets is required.  This means an autonomous system that maintains accurate, real time 
data on commodity identification, quantity and location: in short a system that provides TAV 
and should have the following levels of visibility: 
 
• In the Box Visibility.  Asset information must be autonomously updated as items enter or 
leave a container.  The data must be transmitted to a main database quickly and accurately. 
• In-Facility Visibility. Items within a facility, such as a depot, a ship or in the BSA, must be 
tracked so that their location within the facility is known. 
• Wide Area Tracking.  Wide area tracking should allow for the tracking of assets within the 
amphibious objective area. 
• In-Transit Visibility.  In transit visibility would allow for any item to be tracked whilst 
moving from one location to another and that information translated into a meaningful 
time/distance form to both customers and suppliers. 
 
Material Distribution System 
 
Whilst the sea base would provide the storage and accessibility of sustainment assets, it must 
be supplemented by a reliable material distribution system.  The system must be dedicated to 
distributing equipment from the sea base forward to the landing force. 
 
Landing Zone 
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The OMFTS philosophy of ship to objective manoeuvre means avoiding the large build up 
of supplies ashore.  Cargo must be delivered to support areas in proximity to the manoeuvre 
forces.  There will be a requirement for an Landing Zone Support Area (LZSA) close to the 
manoeuvre elements, but it must have considerably less footprint than is currently the case.  
It will need to be an area where equipment, facilities and personnel are available to receive 
packaged supplies, material, fuel and water from the sea base.  An important feature of these 
LZSAs will be the capability to build up or disperse hardware in hours rather than days. 
 
Command and Control Requirements 
 
The importance of command and control in logistics organizations is well recognised.  This 
is even more important in an environment where the hard division between sea and land 
forms a barrier to many forms of communication.  The essential elements can best be 
captured by stating the requirements of a CSS Commander: 
• Situational Awareness.  The logistics commander will require awareness of the tactical 
situation, for both friendly and enemy forces, to the same standard as the operational 
commander. 
• Common Logistics Picture.  They will require access to a logistics picture from "factory to 
foxhole". 
• Maximum Automation.  Logistics requests, reports and returns must be automated 
whenever possible. 
• Devolved Execution.  Whilst all the above demands centralised control, the requirement 
for decentralised execution is not invalidated, since the volume of logistics orders is likely 
to overwhelm even the most sophisticated of systems. 
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Inventory and Warehousing 
 
There is a complicated supply chain to get the WRS from the depots onto the shipping and 
once they are there, the schedules will not necessarily be complete.  A database of what has 
been embarked will not be available until the ASP have constructed it, provided they are able 
to. Nor is there any link in the supply chain from industry to the task force.  Items that have to 
come from industry will be ordered by the depot, for delivery there and subsequent 
transportation to the task force.  Thus there is a requirement to directly link the task force and 
industry.  The process also assumes that the traditional amphibious operations paradigm of 
Plan, Embark, Rehearse, Move and Assault (PERMA) will be followed, in order that the right 
WRS are loaded.  Yet OMFTS demands EMPRA (Embark, Move, Plan, Rehearse and 
Assault).  The current system is flawed, in that not only is there no clear picture of what has 
been embarked, there may be no method of establishing it.  Thus it is clear that loading WRS 
onto STUFT does not meet the requirement and what is needed are stores ships capable of 
managing the inventory.  An additional element to be considered is how to reduce the tare 
weight of supplies, and what scope there is to reduce demand in all classes of supply, in order 
to lighten the burden placed on the supply chain. 
 
Transport 
 
A number of weaknesses in the transport system can be identified.  Firstly there is the 
difficulty of movement ashore.  Traditional methods of movement ashore are either helicopter, 
landing craft, or mexefloat.  The current generation of helicopters are severely restricted in 
their load carrying capacity and cannot readily contribute to volume offload.  The landing craft 
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and the mexefloat are both slow and whilst this is acceptable for short transit distances, at the 
distances demanded by OMFTS, transit times become unrealistic. 
 
For STUFT there is the requirement to erect a ramp support pontoon under the stern gate of 
Ro-Ro ships to offload vehicles: a tedious and time consuming manoeuvre.  Furthermore there 
is a sea state three limitation on ships without a dock to facilitate unloading in rough seas.  To 
this must be added the demands of beach preparation and cargo handling. 
 
Current land transport methods do not meet the needs of OMFTS.  There is a need to enhance 
the transfer capability for an increased stand-off distance.  This translates into greater 
efficiency in stowage, strike-up and a high capacity delivery system. 
 
Fuel 
 
Current methods of fuel distribution and storage are incompatible with the OMFTS concept.  
There is a need to transfer fuel from ship to shore at distances that preclude bottom laid hoses.  
Providing accurate methods of monitoring fuel consumption and delivering the fuel only when 
required, will greatly reduce the demand.  Complementary to achieving this objective would 
be methods of reducing fuel consumption. 
 
Vehicle Maintenance 
 
The current vehicle maintenance system will be over-faced by the demands of OMFTS.  
Vehicles take too long to repair, command and control of maintenance operations is 
fragmented and local.  The size of the Main Repair Group goes against the principle of 
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minimum footprint ashore and the forward repair policy means highly trained artificers are 
sent into high risk areas. 
 
OMFTS requires the development of a central system capable of handling all maintenance 
operations and requests.  The thrust of this philosophy will be: 
 
• To reduce maintenance requirements. 
• To introduce self diagnosis and built-in maintenance alert indicators, that allow remote 
monitoring of vehicle status. 
• To develop a tagging system that monitors the location of a vehicle. 
• By intelligent and detailed remote monitoring and maintenance, reduce the requirement for 
major shore facilities. 
 
Current Command and Control 
 
The current logistic command and control arrangements do not provide the sort of information 
required, either in the detail, or in the timeframe that OMFTS requires.  More capacity, access 
and functionality will be required than ever before.  This means the development of a tactical 
CSS command and control system which includes near real time situational awareness and 
TAV of CSS resources. 
 
Key Issues 
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The whole area of information management is crucial.  It is inextricably linked to command 
and control and even if the sea based concept were to prove invalid, the requirement to 
manage information, rather than inventory would remain relevant. 
 
The most important aspect of logistics information management concerns visibility of 
demand.  The conditions of demand growth and contraction lead to distortion when there is no 
clear picture of what the demand truly is.  It is therefore important to create an information 
system that allows for visibility of demand, in as near real time as possible. 
 
Ammunition has emerged as the great consumer of logistic effort and resources.  Whilst some 
efforts might be made to reduce tare weight, this would not make a significant difference to 
the enormity of the task and some other method of providing the end effects must be sought. 
 
Similarly, military vehicles remain firmly dependent on fossil fuels.  The footprint for fuel 
storage is large, highly vulnerable to disruption by the enemy and not readily moved.  This 
represents the single largest distribution challenge to the whole concept.  Some method must 
therefore be found of either effective fuel distribution, or of drastically reducing the demand. 
 
A Sea-Based Logistics Strategy 
 
Sea-based logistics must provide the functions of CSS from the sea. The focus of effort must 
be on distribution, not transportation, and footprint and inventory must be reduced.  Logistic 
support must be oriented to the military effort and CSS must be synchronised to the demands 
of OMFTS.  There must be economy of effort at all stages, in order to sustain the force for as 
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long as required, not just until supplies are exhausted.  The end state reached must be 
dependable and responsive CSS that takes advantage of new skills and structure, leading to 
world class expeditionary logistics. 
 
Purely by introducing new technology to the problem (that is, automation), need not 
necessarily produce a more efficient system.  A system centred around the information is more 
likely, the way to procede. In order to achieve the strategic objectives, a fundamental change 
to the command and control arrangements is essential.  This would involve creating a 
headquarters that integrated the current functions of the brigade logistics staff along with those 
of the logistic regiment's headquarters, where their function would be the management of the 
supply chain and its information flows. 
 
A crucial element in realising demand visibility, is knowing where orders are in the supply 
chain and this requires an asset tracking system, some elements of which are already in place.  
However, there is a need for all elements of the supply chain to be linked so that an item can 
be found at any time during its journey.  The most challenging part of this is the provision of 
this information once the items have reached the shore.  However, the technology to construct 
a suitable satellite based secure communications link already exists. 
 
A sea base from which to support operations is essential.  This base would be the centre for 
the reception of outloaded WRS, their stowage during transit and their platform for rapid 
retrieval, preparation and delivery.  The Fort Class Auxiliary ships could at least partly fill this 
role today: they lack only the ability to interface with surface delivery assets, particularly 
above sea state three.  This could be achieved by the addition of a stem dock, built into the 
requirement of their eventual replacements. 
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An effective distribution system is also required and innovative technology has already 
provided many of the solutions to this particular problem.  These include the Guided Parafoil 
Air Delivery System, the GKN Defence Aquatrack, the Landing Craft Air Cushion and the 
Skyhook Multiple Point Delivery System.  Whilst the V22 Osprey would be capable of 
precision delivery, the development costs alone make acquisition of this aircraft impractical 
for the UK amphibious landing force. 
 
In order to eliminate the logistic burden of shore based maintenance of vehicles, a system of 
remote vehicle maintenance must be established.  This can be achieved by the installation of 
sensors with transponder links to the CSS headquarters.  This would allow mechanics afloat to 
monitor the location and status of vehicles ashore and despatch the relevant parts and if 
required, a repair team fully equipped to deal with the problem. 
 
Overall Conclusions 
 
For OMFTS to be a viable strategy, a sea based logistics strategy must accompany it, as must 
the means to deliver it.  Central to this is the provision of an information system that allows 
the logisticians to fully support the operational commander's intent and they can only do this if 
they have a real time appreciation of the demand, provided by total visibility of the supply 
chain.  The provision of an appropriate information system, is therefore more important that 
any other aspect and without it, delivery systems, reductions in demand and any other 
initiatives become academic. 
 
 13
The information system must allow the operators at the front to make demands directly, 
without filters or barriers and these must be actioned as quickly as the operational priorities 
dictate.  Of even greater importance is that the operators must know when they will be met, in 
order to allow proper planning.  This will require the command and control of logistic 
operations to be centralised and possibly sea based. 
 
Whilst there are a number of equally important facets to the sea based logistics strategy, all of 
which must be implemented for the system to function correctly, the information system 
aspects stand alone as worthy of implementation, even if all others do not emerge as mature 
solutions.  Thus even if the current distribution system were to be maintained or become 
inevitable because the operational demands forced it, the requirement for logistic operations to 
be commanded and controlled from a position of strength, based on real time information is 
not negated.  This part of the strategy therefore remains worthy of implementation regardless 
of other considerations. 
 
A properly constructed sea base for logistics will be required to support this strategy.  Loading 
stores into STUFT will not suffice and stores ships designed not only to store WRS but also to 
facilitate their rapid offload and interface with the appropriate delivery systems will be a 
requirement.  Technology has already provided some appropriate methods of delivery and 
advantage must be taken of these. 
 
No delivery system, regardless of it capacity or speed, can be expected to provide a perfect 
solution.  Demand can always outstrip supply, especially in war.  There is therefore a 
requirement to reduce the logistic demand by decreasing tare weight, increasing fuel economy 
and leveraging leading edge technology to provide maintenance remotely. 
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Two important issues remain unresolved: the provision of appropriate fire support and the 
reliable and continuous supply of fuel.  Whilst the bulk of organic fire support for 3 
Commando Brigade RM is provided by land based artillery, there will be a requirement for a 
large footprint, shore based logistics organization.  Even if all commodities other than artillery 
ammunition were sea based, a significant proportion of the logistic effort would have to be 
ashore. 
 
This issue can only be resolved by the provision of fire support from the sea, where the arsenal 
ship concept is a possible option.  The supply of fuel is linked to the fire support issue.  If 
there is no requirement for a large shore based logistics organization, the demands for fuel are 
reduced, such that they can be met by the use of dracones and Air Portable Fuel Containers.  
However, if demand is high, then a shore based fuel farm is inevitable. 
 
Finally the effects of friction cannot be ignored.  Historically, nations have based their 
logistics planning for war on inventory and gross excess in supply, for very good reasons.  
Friction can debilitate even the most sophisticated of systems and failure of communications, 
compromises of security and the effects of environmental extremes must all be planned for.  
The system that is developed must have redundancy to cope with the unexpected.  When all 
else fails, there must be the ability to fall back on the driver, with a truck, load and map, 
getting through, no matter what.  Thus sea basing is a viable method of providing logistic 
support to the UK amphibious landing force, but not without considerable investment and a 
willingness to accept change. 
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